I. INTRODUCTION
In addressing constitutional cases, judges face no shortage of legal rules, tests, principles, doctrines, and policies upon which to draw. 1 In those cases, the challenge is assumed to be to identify and apply the most relevant such legal rules, tests, principles, doctrines, and policies. An accompanying judicial opinion tries to * Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. 1 Merely for example, in the free speech area, a court might, depending upon the nature and circumstances of the case, consider some sort of "clear and present danger" test; a test for "true threats;" "hecklers' vetos;" "fighting words" of several varieties; overbreadth; prior restraints; public and private figure libel; other sorts of "low value" speech, including speech involved in torts and crimes; numerous forms of commercial speech; obscenity and several different classifications of pornography; speech and symbolic conduct; allegedly indecent speech or conduct; various forms of hate speech and group defamation; a distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech; public forum doctrine; speech in various kinds of electoral contexts; speech in and out of public schools; public employee speech; freedom of association; and "compelled speech" in several contexts, almost all of the above with alternative analyses. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1029-1399 (6th ed. 2009). 5 To the extent constitutional adjudication was to focus on virtues and vices, it could be described as 'aretaic.' For brief contemporary introductions to aretaic or virtue ethics in general, see, e.g., Julia Annas, Virtue Ethics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF , 1966) . It should be noted that the four cardinal virtues do not appear to raise any obvious establishment clause, free exercise, or equal protection problems. 6 See discussion infra Parts III-IV. 7 See discussion infra Parts III-IV. 8 See discussion infra Parts III-IV. and the virtue of justice 9 as the sustained personal disposition to give everyone what is due and proper.
For sheer manageability, our focus is on these four traditional cardinal virtues rather than more broadly on all of the many arguable virtues, whatever their importance. 10 But in compensation, this Article discusses the cardinal virtues, or how they lack, at two levels. This Article thus discusses the cardinal virtues as displayed, or not displayed, by judges themselves. This Article crucially emphasizes the importance of the cardinal virtues as displayed, or not displayed, by broader groups of actors including the general public, partly in response to constitutional decisions.
11
This Article discusses the cardinal virtues in the context of various specific historical constitutional cases. 12 Collectively, the cases justify increased judicial attention to the cardinal virtues, as an important element of constitutional decisionmaking, without improperly distorting the process of adjudication. 13 The judicial cases themselves, however, should not bear the entire burden of justifying a more significant role for the cardinal virtues in constitutional adjudication. The value of the cardinal virtues, collectively and individually, has frequently been discussed by philosophers and social critics.
14 To help make the 9 See discussion infra Parts III-IV. The four cardinal virtues do not operate in isolation from one another; we shall note throughout some overlaps and relationships. 10 To try as well to account for the constitutional role of virtues-or at least arguable virtues-such as honesty and integrity; generosity; patience; humility; loyalty; compassion or caring (beyond the cardinal virtue of justice); benevolence; detachment; chastity; ambition or the lack thereof; punctuality; creativity; magnanimity; reliability; modesty; determination; curiosity; meekness or assertiveness; gentleness; adaptability; cleanliness; mercifulness (as tempering justice); and diligence, to name but a few possibilities, would obviously be beyond what is reasonably possible herein. For a well-researched compilation of a number of widely respected virtues, see CHRISTOPHER PETERSON & MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN 11 Groups might display any of the cardinal virtues to a greater or lesser degree in response to constitutional decisions in light of threats or rewards and incentives as affected by those decisions. A group might show increased self-control in response to a judicial decision that does not itself display exceptional self-control, or perhaps any other virtue. And a group might display greater self-control because a judicial decision displayed not that particular cardinal virtue, the way bravery might inspire bravery in others, but the virtue of wisdom with respect to the public's well-being. Thus judicial wisdom, or sound practical judgment, might increase the rewards of citizen self-control. 12 See discussion infra Part III. 13 See supra note 4.
14 See infra Parts II, IV.
case for greater attention to the cardinal virtues in constitutional adjudication, this Article draws upon some highlights of that broader discussion with special attention to issues of great contemporary importance.
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To set the stage for discussing the judicial cases, though, it will be useful to have some very general initial sense of the possible roles, limits, and values of basic virtues and virtue theory in adjudication. It is to that initial stage-setting that this Article now turns.
II. THE VIRTUES AND JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING: A FEW PRELIMINARIES
The influence of virtue theory within ethics and jurisprudence has not been constant over time. Some years ago, the philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe noted in particular that "[a]nyone who has read Aristotle's [virtue] Ethics and has also read modern moral philosophy must have been struck by the great contrasts between them." 16 The extent to which theorists, judges, and the broader public think in terms of the cardinal virtues is subject to change over time. Merely for the sake of its suggestiveness, rather than to definitively prove anything in particular, consider a bit of casual research based on Google Labs data. 17 Apparently, English-language book references to the four cardinal virtues have involved detectable trends over the past three hundred years. References to 'courage' over that time have been remarkably stable, 18 and references to 'temperance' have also been stable, at lower rates. 19 References to 'wisdom' appear to peak sharply in the period from 1800 to 1830, and then gradually decline until about 1940, at which point such references more or less stabilize. 20 The word (not necessarily in its 'virtue' sense) 'justice' roughly parallels the use of 'wisdom,' but at higher levels after 1800,. 21 Until 1800, 'courage' was more commonly referred to than 'justice,' 22 but the use of the word 'justice' (in whatever sense) spiked 15 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. While our focus will be primarily on the American constitutional context, basic concerns for cardinal virtues such as temperance, practical wisdom, and personal justice are arguably starting to become increasingly prominent elsewhere. See 19 See id. 20 See id. 21 See id. Obviously, 'justice' may be used in a wide variety of senses, even within jurisprudence and ethics, with no direct reference to justice as a personal virtue. 22 
See id.
dramatically around 1800 23 before gradually trending downward from 1830 to 1950, at which point references to 'justice' fluctuate or, of late, trend upward. 24 None of the four cardinal virtue words is as prominent in this database as it was in 1820. 25 It may well be that virtue ethics in general has been long-neglected, 26 but also the subject of a relatively recent revival. 27 Our focus is, however, not on any recent popularity of virtue ethics, 28 but on its possible contributions to constitutional jurisprudence in our day. And there is certainly reason to suspect that fully legitimate attention to the virtues-and to the four cardinal virtues in particularcould be of genuine value in resolving and justifying constitutional cases.
At a very general level, it is reasonable to argue that the virtues and good government reciprocally bring each other into clearer focus. Professor Ronald Dworkin, interpreting Aristotle's classic virtue theory, makes this argument. Crucially, Professor Dworkin, following Aristotle, holds that "[w]e understand good government better by better understanding happiness and the virtues, which good government fosters."
29
A broadly liberal form of government, including the judiciary, need not vainly seek to be neutral as among all basic forms of virtue and vice, including injustice, thoughtlessness, smugness, and narcissism, for example. 30 And if a broadly liberal government, including its judiciary in constitutional cases, may seek within limits to 23 See id. 24 See id. 25 See id. 26 See, e.g., Michael Slote, Virtue Ethics, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO 36 Id. Tocqueville's example involves only an initial, rather than a sustained, rejection of necessary sacrifice. Such a sustained rejection could indicate a greater deficiency of the relevant public virtue. There is no reason to suppose that from its founding until its historical conclusion, a political society can never vary in the degree to which it possesses or displays any of the cardinal virtues. Societies, as well as persons, can presumably grow, or diminish, over time in any of the cardinal virtues. Of course, societies may also merely appear to have grown or diminished in a virtue because their circumstances have become more or less trying in relevant respects.
help of institutions-a sensible legal framework and strong social connections." 37 Akst then recognizes the possible role for constitutions in particular in legitimately discouraging some departures from basic public virtues.
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One might still wonder, though, whether there can be any legitimate role for considering even basic virtues in constitutional cases. In any interesting and complex constitutional case, courts will typically have a range of rules, tests, principles, doctrines, and policies at their disposal, 39 and some of the tests will themselves allow for sensible and prudent judicial judgment and for flexibility in application and outcome. 40 The real answer to this question as to the role of virtue-thinking must depend partly on a sample of actual cases discussed briefly below, 41 in the context of the four cardinal virtues, in themselves, and in social context. 42 But we should consider the possibility that whatever their rigidity or flexibility, the various rules, tests, principles, doctrines, and policies themselves cannot always provide an unimprovable response and rationale in constitutional cases. Neither rules nor considerations of virtues will always be self-selecting or determinate in dictating constitutional outcomes and rationales. 41 See discussion infra Parts III-IV. 42 See discussion infra Parts III-IV. 43 Even if a rule is thought to be universalist or absolute within its proper scope, we must still decide, in part on the basis of prudence or practical wisdom, how to limit the proper scope and elements of the rule. We must still decide, for example, what counts as "speech" for free speech purposes. See, e.g., R. George Wright, What Counts as 'Speech' in the First Place?: Determining the Scope of the Free Speech Clause, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1217 REV. (2010 . 44 For an emphasis on wisdom in a broad, inclusive, aspirational sense, but with a subordinate emphasis on a number of virtues that must be present in a reasonably stable, broadly liberal society, see ROBERT KANE, ETHICS AND THE QUEST FOR WISDOM 256 (2010) (citing in particular "honesty, respect, responsibility, fairness, trustworthiness, and caring" as virtues necessary for a healthy polity) (emphasis omitted). distinctive way. And there is no dislodging . . . questions about the nature and . . . the acquisition of virtue." 45 We need not make so ambitious a claim, though. Constitutional adjudicators can certainly pay primary attention to rules and the like; our interest is merely in a genuinely useful supplementary role for attention to the virtues. And the persons doing the "seeing" 46 of and through virtue include not just the judges, but broader groups as well, including the general public.
The less ambitious, but important, role for attention to the virtues in adjudication is more accurately captured by virtue ethicist Rosalind Hursthouse. Professor Hursthouse argues generally, but in a way we can adopt, that a certain amount of virtue and corresponding moral or practical wisdom (phronesis) might be required both to interpret the (moral or legal) rules and to determine which rule was most appropriately to be applied in a particular case. 47 Other views suggest that rules and principles constitute merely one side of the proverbial coin, with the virtues constituting the other side of the coin, and with a virtuous person being merely one who never violates the rules and principles. 48 We need not, however, so closely identify rules with virtues, any more than we should suggest that virtues should simply replace rules.
One way of distinguishing a useful role for the virtues might involve posing a hypothetical question. Let us suppose that we must entrust the well-being of a vulnerable person we care about, Minor, to one of two very similar adults, Nomos or Prudence. Nomos and Prudence as two persons have similar knowledge and experiences, equal intelligence, and they accept, with equal sincerity, identical moral rules, principles, doctrines, and policies.
We could stipulate to all this, and still have rational grounds for preferring to entrust Minor to the care of either Nomos or Prudence over the other. Differences between Nomos and Prudence in the relevant basic moral virtues, crucially, are not entirely ruled out by the above stipulations. Nomos, for example, might be wellintentioned, but, even in Nomos' own eyes, lamentably "weak-willed," or likely to give in to temptation. Prudence, let us suppose, in sharp contrast, has an established track record of somehow minimizing the personal appeal of temptation, or of success in resisting temptations when they arise.
In such a case, it would hardly be arbitrary of us to entrust Minor specifically to Prudence, rather than to Nomos, despite the many important respects, including the sincerely held principles, in which they are identical. To do the opposite, on the facts stipulated, would actually be irresponsible, and indeed unreasonable, on our part. And we can reach this preference for Prudence over Nomos even as we 45 We thus have, at a minimum, some initial grounds for a reasonable hope that proper attention to the virtues, and to the basic cardinal virtues in particular, may be of significant assistance in deciding, elaborating upon, and justifying constitutional decisions. But let us move on to critique a small sampling of the actual historical constitutional cases on that assumption, as a matter of further evidence.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW AND THE CARDINAL VIRTUES: SOME ILLUSTRATIONS
The cardinal virtues are, again, classically assumed to include courage, temperance or proper self-restraint, justice as a personal virtue, and perhaps most broadly and crucially, the virtue of practical wisdom. 50 We need not explore the extent to which any two or all of these virtues are linked, or even inseparable. 51 Based on the few actual judicial examples we briefly consider below, however, it is reasonable to suppose that each of these virtues, especially practical wisdom, is often found in proximity to one or more of the others. A judicial decision displaying or promoting one often displays or promotes another. It is, however, also reasonable to imagine, based on our case selection, that a judicial decision displaying or promoting one basic vice may well display or promote the same or one or more other basic vices.
Most importantly, for our purposes, though, the cases below illustrate that in constitutional adjudication, the presence or absence of one or more cardinal virtues, in the judicial decision-maker or among some affected public, can be important in ways that are not fully captured by attention to rules, tests, principles, doctrines, or policies.
A. Courage and the Constitution
It is fair to say that freedom of speech law in particular focuses on rules and judicial tests. 52 But it has been recognized that freedom of speech is also about the particular cardinal virtue of courage, or the lack thereof. The judicial rules and tests applied in free speech cases may affect the capacity of the public to resist a "chill" or to display personal and civic courage. Free speech jurisprudence may reflect the courage, or lack thereof, of both the public and the judiciary. In any event, free speech jurisprudence is in a practical sense interwoven with courage, or its lack, in important ways not reducible to the rules or tests themselves. But we should not invariably equate a judicial finding of constitutionally protected speech with a display of genuine judicial courage; this may vary with context.
The most widely celebrated linkage of free speech and the virtue of courage is that of Justice Brandeis, concurring in the case of Whitney v. California. 53 Justice Brandeis begins with the broad assertion that the constitutional Framers "believed liberty to [be] the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty." 54 The meaning of the word "secret" may not be precisely clear. It may not be clear whether the meaning of "secret" in both instances above is intended to be the same. But Brandeis does briefly elaborate on speech itself and the problem of fear, or irrational fear, as the presumed opposite of the virtue of courage.
Justice Brandeis thus argues that by itself, "[f]ear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears." 55 Apart from instances in which the speech imminently threatens a serious harm, 56 supposedly harmful political speech should prompt us to address and rebut such speech on the merits. Our courage in legally permitting such speech is bolstered by our confidence in the relevance and power, over time, of counterspeech. 57 Thus on the Brandeis view, courage inspires protecting speech that some would regard as dangerous. This courage is directly displayed by the judges deciding the free speech cases in question. But over the long term, that judicial courage must be supported by some degree of courage, or admiration for courage, within elements of the broader public. The public's own courage may have been reinforced, or partly inspired, by judicial courage. The necessary judicial and broader civic courage may actually sustain one another in a "virtuous circle." And judicial and citizen courage in tolerating potentially dangerous speech may be strengthened and confirmed when the feared consequences of such speech do not come to pass.
58
This is certainly an important lesson on the relationships between constitutional free speech cases and the judicial and civic virtue of courage. 59 There are of course 53 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled on other grounds, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) . 54 Id. at 375 (emphasis added). 55 Id. at 376. 56 See id. 57 See id. at 377 (explicitly contrasting cowardice with the virtue of courage among the American Revolutionaries). 58 Consider, e.g., the circumstances and consequences in the racially charged rhetoric case of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Of course, some political speech cases are controversial for reasons best conceived in terms other than that of a public fear of future bad public consequences, and the courage or lack of courage to manage those fears. See, e.g., the military funeral protest case of Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 59 For further discussion, see Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1567, 1569 (1999). From a slightly different angle, consider also Professor Blasi's classic argument that free speech jurisprudence should be crafted with special attention to those eras in which the literal courage of our convictions, and our sense of security, is at its some inherent practical limitations at work. The virtue of courage often depends, for example, upon the distinct cardinal virtue of practical wisdom or prudence. 60 And the real practical value of judicial courage over time may well depend upon the guiding virtue of judicial practical wisdom, as in a number of the classic civil rights and equal protection adjudications.
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More controversially, though, we should ask whether judicial courage in deciding and explaining free speech cases always tends to support the speaker. The twentieth century association between free speech and courage, especially in political dissent, wartime, and subversive advocacy cases, 62 may inadvertently tend to actually inhibit courageous re-thinking in some free speech contexts.
Consider, for example, a case of repeated verbal condemnations of vulnerable adolescents in a public school setting that may not allow for voluntarily avoiding the perhaps targeted message. Suppose a court was to uphold such public school student expression as constitutionally protected speech. Would it be clear, in every such instance, that upholding free speech requires greater judicial courage than allowing its reasonable regulation based on a controversial willingness to carefully work through the relevant interests at stake, including those of the speakers, their future selves, the "targets," other students, and the community and public at large? 63 In some free speech cases, judicial courage may potentially take more than one form, and discerning the most valuable form of judicial courage may require unusual practical wisdom. Consider as well the case of "animal cruelty speech" in general. 64 The more that upholding controversial speech is celebrated as courageous, at least in the relevant circles, the less real courage is required, paradoxically, to uphold such speech. On the other hand, professional courage among federal judges might be actually required to resist assimilating an animal cruelty video to protected speech, even where the free speech challenge focuses largely on over breadth grounds. 60 Some uncontrolled fears are unreasonable, and might be diminished by the exercise of practical wisdom. The virtue of courage may be transformed into the vice of foolhardiness or rashness if one impulsively decides to run into a brick wall, rather than merely walk through a nearby door. On the other hand, one probably still displays real courage-if pointlessly, or even foolishly-if one's lack of practical wisdom leads one to imagine that one is confronting serious danger when no such danger really exists. 65 
See id.
The deepest and most valuable form of judicial courage in a range of free speech cases, however, might be of a different sort. Such courage might set aside the appeal of being thought courageous for championing free speech, and, with due judicial modesty and humility, ask whether any of the basic reasons 66 for constitutionally enshrining free speech in the first place are distinctively present in the case, even if upholding the speech would somehow seem generally libertarian or broad-minded.
Or consider, for example, the opportunity to display some form of judicial courage in some of the violent video game cases, 67 or in the commercial nude dancing cases. 68 In these and a variety of pornography cases, 69 a cynic might suggest that the number of the court's references to works of classic literature is sometimes proportional to the court's desire to verbally "distance" itself from the unseemly "expression" in question. Courts may cite a dozen classic works incorporating verbal depictions of violence. But having done so, they often do not then much reflect on whether the basic reasons for protecting speech 70 are really distinctly at stake in the case. In some cases, where the activity involved has little to do with meaningful speech, such reflection might require a kind of cognitive or professional courage.
More broadly, free speech cases, along with some of the classic civil rights and equal protection cases, even as decided by independent Article III federal judges, 71 may thus hinge on forms of judicial courage and fortitude. We must, however, also remember that more judicial courage, even of the right kind, is not necessarily better. Judicial courage should be informed by, and occasionally tempered by, the cardinal virtue of judicial prudence or practical wisdom. 68 See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991). The plurality opinion virtually begins by declaring that respondent "Miller wishes to dance nude because she believes she would make more money doing so." Id. at 563. This of course fails to distinguish her purported speech, and its message or motivation, from virtually any purely commercial transaction itself. 69 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (virtual child pornography case). 70 See supra notes 66, 68. Again, with respect to some general citizen audiences, little judicial courage would be required to uphold a particular regulation of, say, purely virtual child pornography. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 235. But with respect to other audiences, a kind of courage and fortitude might be required if a court were to appear to lend aid and comfort to censorious groups by upholding a regulation of what is claimed to be 'speech' within the meaning of the first amendment. Arguably, the classic constitutional example of the occasional need to balance the virtues of courage and practical wisdom is the Court's decision in Ex Parte McCardle. 73 In McCardle, the Court declined to decide on the merits 74 of a habeas corpus case that had been briefed and argued before the Court before Congress repealed the jurisdictional statute on which McCardle had relied, 75 while not also repealing an alternative jurisdictional ground. 76 Under the circumstances, including the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson by the Reconstruction Era Congress, 77 the Court's discretion might indeed have been the better part of valor. Or in our terms, any lack of valor on the Court's part might have been outweighed by the value of the Court's surviving, intact and unimpaired, to fight another day, in accordance with the virtue of prudence and practical wisdom.
B. Constitutional Temperance and Prudence in and Beyond the Courts
We have already referred to prudence or practical wisdom as guiding and limiting the virtue of courage. 78 While wisdom, and judicial wisdom in particular, occupy a position of special prominence, wisdom itself suggests that courts should often decline to second-guess the practical wisdom of congressional 79 or expert administrative agency 80 policy judgments. Here, we briefly consider the wisdom, or lack thereof, of judicial constitutional response to problems of temperance, or of reasonable self-control and self-restraint, on the part of actors beyond the courts.
It is difficult to deny that many important federal and state-level political decisions involve exercising, or failure to exercise, temperance in the sense of reasonable self-control, or appropriate self-restraint, as distinct from self-indulgence, self-absorption, or unreasonable discounting of the more distant future. 81 The 'self' 153, 194 (1978) . 80 This is the basic logic of the "second step" of the major case Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984) , in which a reviewing court is generally to defer to any reasonable and permissible agency interpretation of a statutory term, despite possible judicial reservations as to the wisdom of the agency's interpretation. 81 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). in self-indulgence may refer here to an individual person, or to groups at various levels.
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Determining what counts as intemperate behavior may of course require the virtue of practical wisdom. Deciding whether to do anything about one's intemperance, and if so, precisely what, similarly may require practical wisdom. And the virtue of practical wisdom will likely be required as well of a court when constitutionally adjudicating another branch of government's attempts to address that branch's own intemperance.
Let us consider a judicial constitutional example. It is not difficult to see the Court's opinion in Bowsher v. Synar 83 as a response to Congress' recognizing its own intemperance in the context of federal budget deficit spending, borrowing, taxing, public indebtedness, and re-election. 84 In Bowsher, Congress had established a role for the Comptroller General in reducing annual federal budget deficits by sequestering appropriated funds, pursuant to statutory guidelines. 85 Though the Comptroller General was relatively well insulated from congressional removal, 86 the Bowsher majority found him to be an agent of Congress.
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The majority then formalistically determined the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings statute to involve the execution of the law by an agent of Congress, 88 and therefore to be unconstitutional. 89 The Court in Bowsher thus found itself in the position of characterizing the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings statute as a classic 90 congressional "power-grab;" as an attempt by Congress to aggrandize its own authority at the expense of the executive 82 Thus while we might think of some individual person as self-indulgent or as heavily discounting the longer-term future, it is often much more helpful to think of particular groups, or an entire culture, in these terms. See infra Part III. 83 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 714. 85 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 717-18. Congressional intemperance, on one theory, had become serious enough to prompt a correspondingly serious attempt at reducing its consequences, but had not yet progressed to a point at which Congress was incapable of serious attempts at selfcorrection. In some cases, intemperance may even become so severe as to diminish the will for appropriate self-correction. 86 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 759, 765, 773 (White, J., dissenting). 87 Id. at 726. 88 Id. branch. And in a formalistic way, the logic of the Court majority, on its own terms, is faultless.
But in order to find the majority's logic more deeply convincing, we must ignore the realistic insulation of the Comptroller General from congressional dismissal. 91 We must also ignore the realistic costs to Congress of dismissing the very actor Congress had designated to save itself from its own intemperate budgeting for shortterm re-electability. 92 Most fundamentally, we must fail to see the Gramm-RudmanHollings statue as an implicit admission of Congress' intemperate inability to restrain its own individual and collective impulses to spend improvidently. 93 The point is not that if the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings statute had been upheld, the federal deficit and indebtedness picture would today look substantially different. Rather, the point is that the Bowsher Court majority saw only a fragment of the overall picture, and ignored important elements of institutional virtue and vice on the part of Congress. In this respect, it is fair to ask whether the Court majority itself displayed much of the cardinal virtue of practical wisdom.
There are traces of some elements of the Bowsher majority as well in the subsequent Line Item Veto Act 94 case of Clinton v. New York. 95 Clinton involved a constitutional separation of powers challenge to the Act. The basic idea of the Act was to give the President some limited, overridable authority 96 to veto appropriations found by the President to increase the federal deficit while being inessential to the national interest. 97 The Clinton majority noted that the Act allowed for presidential veto of portions of bills, as opposed to entire bills, thus allowing the President to, in effect, amend a bill as well as to veto the bill. 98 On this basis, the majority held the Act unconstitutional as violative of the Presentment Clause. 99 The Clinton Court characterized the familiar constitutional veto mechanism as a "‛finely wrought' procedure." 100 If we place ourselves in the position of the 91 See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 759, 765, 773 (White, J., dissenting). 92 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 93 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. For classic recognition of the general differences between short and long term personal and public interests, and the need for governmental institutions to bring these interests into alignment, see DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF . 96 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 436-37. 97 Id. at 436. 98 Id. at 438. 99 Id. at 421 (citing U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 2). 100 Id. at 447.
constitutional Framers, there is indeed something unsettling about a presidential "veto" of merely "one provision in an Act that occupies 536 pages of the Statutes at Large."
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The problem, though, is that the Framers might have been unsettled not only by vetoing sections of a bill, but by the presentation of 536 pages of richly diverse legislative material as merely one single bill, to be either vetoed as a whole or signed as a whole by the President. Depending upon matters of timing as well as content, a 536 page omnibus bill might be realistically unvetoable, independent of its merits, in whole or in part. One might well view the rise of massive, tome-like budget bills, to be vetoed or signed as a single unity, as the more dramatic shift in congressionalpresidential relations. The Line Item Veto Act could, on this view, be considered as a consensual attempt to restore something closer to the separation of powers envisioned by the Framers.
But for our purposes, the most important question is not one of formalistic linedrawing, or even of the Framers' expectations and intent. It is instead a question that incorporates those considerations, but that focuses as well on the cardinal virtues, including apparent institutional intemperance as in Bowsher, 102 practical wisdom on the part of all three branches, and as should have been clear even in 1998, the crucial virtue of justice between generations. 103 Consider, in this regard, the opinion in the Clinton case of Justice Kennedy, concurring rather than dissenting.
104 While agreeing with the opinion for the Court, Justice Kennedy nonetheless begins his concurrence, startlingly, with these words: "A Nation cannot plunder its own treasury without putting its Constitution and its survival in peril. The statute before us, then, is of first importance, for it seems undeniable the Act will tend to restrain persistent excessive spending." 105 Justice Kennedy thus appears, through his concurrence, to unfortunately hold open the possibility that contrary to frequent assertions, 106 the Constitution may indeed be a suicide pact.
Our point, though, is not to take sides on this issue, at least directly. Instead, it is to encourage proper reflection upon and recourse to the virtues of temperance, practical wisdom, and (intergenerational) justice to avoid having to interpret the Constitution as an instrument of societal destruction. Thus we do not recommend judicially or otherwise amending the Constitution for the sake of promoting the basic virtues. We ask whether the Framers would have wanted the separation of powers doctrine to be interpreted to foster injustice between generations, gross continuing intemperance and improvidence in public budgeting, imprudence and lack of practical wisdom, and collective self-indulgence to the point of putting national survival "in peril."
107 It is difficult to accept imperiling constitutional or national survival as a guide to the Framers' intent, or as an element of any other defensible approach to interpreting the Constitution.
The results in Bowsher and in Clinton were not constitutionally inevitable, and could have been avoided, likely to the public well-being, by greater exercise of the cardinal virtues, including practical wisdom, and by greater judicial attention to the cardinal virtues in general. This is not to say that the Court in this respect deserves blame, that hindsight has not clarified these matters, or that the judicial exercise of practical wisdom is usually effortless and uncontroversial.
The point is rather that the effort to focus more meaningfully on the cardinal virtues is legitimate, worth making, and worth taking seriously. As the philosopher Robert Kane has observed, " [a] good deal of what is called 'practical wisdom' . . . is knowing enough about ourselves and about others and the world around us to aptly choose which experiments in living are likely to be fulfilling and which are not."
108
Greater judicial efforts along these lines may be difficult, but are practically essential.
109

C. Justice as a Personal Virtue: Constitutional Responses to Personal Injustice
As a cardinal virtue, justice involves a sustained disposition to give to everyone neither more nor less than is due. 110 As private actors, we can exhibit this virtue, or its opposite, perhaps with one degree or another of state involvement. Courts may find themselves assessing, at a constitutional level, alleged instances of the vice of injustice, again in a context of greater or lesser state involvement. The provisions of a will, for example, may reflect the judgment of a private party. But the drafting, execution, interpretation, and possible enforcement of a will, as officially determined to be valid or invalid, implicate the state to one degree or another.
To pursue this example, we start with the general principle of broad testamentary freedom in the disposition of property. 111 In particular, all else equal, "the right to make a testamentary disposition of property is fundamental, is most solemnly assured by law, and does not depend upon its judicious use." 112 The most extreme 107 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 449 (Kennedy, J., concurring). This phrase is of course borrowed from Justice Kennedy's own characterization of the situation. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. There are limits to such testamentary freedom. Consider, for example, the dissenting opinion in the famous case of Riggs v. Palmer, 115 involving a legatee who killed the testator to prevent the revocation of the testator's will. The dissenters appreciated that:
[m]odern jurisprudence, in recognizing the right of the individual, under more or less restrictions, to dispose of his property after his death, subjects it to legislative control, both as to extent and as to mode of exercise. Complete freedom of testamentary disposition of one's property has not been and is not the universal rule.
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At a minimum, sufficiently strong considerations of law and public policy can place limitations on the otherwise broad freedom to dispose of property unwisely, ungratefully, or unjustly. 117 Even the most fervent defenses of testamentary freedom recognize something like this limitation:
To wrest a man's property from the person to whom he has given it, and to divert it to others from whom he has desired to withhold it, is a most violent injustice, amounting to nothing less than a post mortem robbery, which no court should sanction, unless thoroughly satisfied, either that the dispositions of the will are reprobated by law, or that the testator was legally incapable to make a will.
118
Inescapably, among the underlying considerations in such cases must be the nature of any testamentary injustice, and the state's perceived involvement in perhaps approving of or giving effect to that injustice. Not all injustice is equal in these respects.
A clear sense of the dynamics involved is conveyed in another context by Justice Thurgood Marshall, dissenting, in an important 'state action' case.
119
Justice Marshall doubts that a heavily regulated utility's granting only limited hearing rights to alleged non-paying customers involves no "state action." 120 This is a case of the utility's denying service on grounds of merely alleged non-payment. The majority finds no state action in such a case. But Justice Marshall then raises a hypothetical question: What if an equally regulated utility had adopted a policy denying utility service on the basis of race? Would the majority in that case still have found no state action? 121 Justice Marshall understandably suspects that in the latter case, state action would indeed be found. The best explanation for any differences in the two case outcomes would, on our view, reflect the basic idea that the scope of 'state action' should generally reflect the scope of the state's moral responsibilities, given its powers and limitations thereon.
122 Not all initially private injustices are equal in gravity, or in broader cultural and historical meaning and import. 123 For some kinds of injustices, particularly those explicitly involving race, the state should more readily accept a significant share of responsibility.
On this basis, consider the Supreme Court's legal reactions to the initially personal injustice, as we would now universally see it, resulting in the cases of Evans v. Newton 124 and Evans v. Abney. 125 Against the background of broad 126 but ultimately limited 127 testamentary freedom was the devise of a hundred acres of land, centrally located in Macon, Georgia. 128 The devised land was to serve as a public park solely for the use of white persons. 129 Under the will, the land was to be owned and controlled by the City of Macon, 130 thus establishing state action and triggering the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition of racially segregated public facilities. 131 The majority in Newton recognized that the City's maintaining the park for years, at first on the specified racially segregated basis, and then allowing, contrary to the will, for some non-segregated use, linked the City to the initially private racial injustice.
132
The formal legal act of later 121 Id.
substituting a private board of trustees for the governing public authority would not immediately transform the cultural meaning of the park, or dissipate the effects of prior state management and control. 133 The City would, realistically, continue to bear partial responsibility for initially private injustice.
134
In the succeeding closely related Abney 135 case, however, a different Court majority 136 more controversially drew the line of public responsibility for initially private injustice. The Abney Court found no denial of racial equal protection in a Georgia state court determination that because the testator's racially segregationist intent could no longer be carried out, 137 the trust provision failed 138 and the land reverted to the heirs of the testator, 139 as opposed to remaining as a racially desegregated public park.
140
Our point is not to dispute the testator's original segregationist intent, the centrality of that segregationist intent, or whether the testator's intent would have changed over time. Rather, it is that the state became complicitous in the testator's personal injustice when it chose to transform the now desegregated public park into privately owned property of the testator's heirs. The state was confronted with a choice between giving effect to the segregationist intent of the testator, or the testator's intent to provide a public park, insofar as that intent was consistent with basic norms of racial justice.
141
Doubtless there is a sense in which Macon residents of every race suffered a loss, to one degree or another, when the now desegregated public park was returned, as private property, to the testator's heirs. But the state-imposed outcomes, and the resulting harms, were evidently not equally borne among the races. Some persons might resentfully conclude that had the case not been brought, white residents could still have benefitted from the park. Such resentment might, on this logic, have been focused on racial minorities.
142
More directly, though, the state's decision to prioritize the racially segregationist element of the testator's intent regarding public facilities over the intent to provide a park for Macon residents officially legitimizes an injustice. The state decision in effect re-stigmatizes local members of a race deemed by the testator to be 133 See id. 134 See generally Wright, supra note 122. 135 Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970). 136 Id. at 436 (Justice Black, who had dissented in Newton wrote the majority opinion in Abney). 137 Id. unqualified to associate with whites in public parks. While the racial 143 rationale underlying the will may well have been quite broad, the local African-Americans residing in Macon, Georgia bore most of the inevitable racial stigma. That stigma was, as a constitutionally cognizable injury, 144 thus felt locally rather than nationally. 145 The state's reconstruction and in a sense re-enactment and effectuating of the original racial discrimination should have been recognized as establishing partial state responsibility, state action, and ultimately a violation of the equal protection clause. 146 The majority in Abney could thus have done substantially better in constitutionally responding to an initially personal expression of the vice of injustice.
IV. CONCLUSION: DO THE CARDINAL VIRTUES STILL MAKE A DIFFERENCE AT THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LEVEL?
A. The Cardinal Virtues in Contemporary Context
Historically, the prominence of the cardinal virtues across cultural lines has been substantial. The cardinal virtues are emphasized in the ancient Jewish tradition, 147 in Plato, 148 Aristotle, 149 various Stoics, 150 Thomas Aquinas, 151 and as we have seen throughout, by a number of modern writers, in and out of fashion.
argued, " [t] o suppose that any form of government will secure liberty or happiness without any virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea." 158 But for our purposes, justice as a virtue is linked with, and dependent upon, each of the other cardinal virtues. And in our own era, the relationship between selfdiscipline or temperance and both practical wisdom and justice in particular lies at the center of some of the most crucial public policy problems, including financial conflicts of interest among generations.
A fundamental part of a crucial public policy problem, stated in virtue terms, is that in recent decades, "among people in the mainstream United States, strengths of temperance are infrequently endorsed and seldom praised," 159 with 'prudence' as well being occasionally minimized or disparaged. 160 The historical recognition of the importance of temperance, self-restraint, and related virtues has been longstanding and broad-based. 161 Even in the modern era, the value of the temperancerelated virtues has not gone entirely unrecognized. 162 But of late, the idea of selfcontrol as a virtue has faced indifference, hostility, and intense competition.
In several recent studies, for example, Professor Jean M. Twenge has contrasted self-control with the widely emphasized idea of self-esteem. The virtue of selfcontrol turns out to be a much better predictor than (high or low) self-esteem of important outcomes. Professor Twenge concludes that "[s]elf-control, or the ability to persevere and keep going, is a much better predictor of life outcomes than selfesteem. Children high in self-control make better grades and finish more years of education, and they're less likely to use drugs. . . . Self-control predicts all of those things researchers had hoped self-esteem would, but hasn't." 163 The importance of the virtue of temperance, or its absence, may extend beyond the familiar indicators of basic prosperity or its lack thereof. Sigmund Freud raised the stakes considerably. Freud classically, if controversially, argued that
[u]nder the influence of the ego's instinct of self-preservation, the pleasure principle is replaced by the reality principle. This latter principle does not abandon the intention of ultimately obtaining pleasure, but it nevertheless demands and carries into effect the postponement of satisfaction, the abandonment of a number of possibilities of gaining satisfaction and the temporary toleration of unpleasure as a step on the long indirect road to pleasure. 164 Thus temperance, in the form of the collective willingness to defer gratification, is said to be ultimately a matter of collective "self-preservation." 165 If there is any ambiguity, Freud removes it by opining that "[t]he pleasure principle [or lack of temperance] seems actually to serve the death instincts." 166 At least on Freud's theory, then, collective temperance may be ultimately not a matter of lifestyle, but of cultural life and death. 167 The need to collectively exhibit the virtue, as well, of practical wisdom or broad prudence should also be clear. While practical wisdom is related to each of the preceding virtues, there is a sense in which we can think about practical wisdom in its own right. Practical wisdom is not primarily a matter of motives, gestures, intentions, or symbolism apart from direct and indirect consequences. 168 John Stuart Mill defines the term, while linking it to temperance, as "a correct foresight of consequences, a just estimation of their importance to the object in view, and repression of any unreflecting impulse at variance with the deliberate purpose."
A number of Supreme Court cases are thought to embody not just an admirable deployment of tests and rules, but the virtue of wisdom. It is likely a sense of the Court's broad and long-range perspective, along with the Court's ability to discount fears of possible short-term consequences that lead some to credit the Court with practical wisdom in the "steel seizure" separation of powers case Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.
170
Practical wisdom requires such perspective; an understanding of persons and their interest, motivations, and capacities, and of the world and its workings. In part, this requires the practically wise person, or court, to resist a variety of cognitive and other forms of bias. 171 Most broadly, and particularly in deciding important constitutional cases, Wisdom requires an experience-based knowledge of the world (including, especially, the world of human nature). It requires . . . the ability to . . . discern the most important aspects of the acquired knowledge, knowing what to use and what to discard, almost on a case-by-case basis (put another way, it requires knowing when to follow rules but also when the usual rules no longer apply). 172 In some important constitutional cases, the competing legal rules, tests, legal principles, and legal doctrines can only carry the court so far. In such cases, courts should, within the bounds of what is constitutionally legitimate, accept responsibility to exercise a form of practical wisdom that is not reducible to the application of competing constitutional tests. 173 Without arrogantly assuming the role of Platonic Guardians, 174 or otherwise violating their oaths and judicial role obligations, 175 the courts should be alert to the possibility of supplementing the usual constitutional test concern for the consequences of their actions and decisions [and] successfully resist impulses and other choices that satisfy shorter term goals at the expense of longer term ones . . .").
as well as the distinct values of public university autonomy and institutional academic freedom. 187 But in emphasizing diversity, in and of itself, as compelling, 188 and then subjecting the diversity rationale, alone, to a narrow-tailoring inquiry, 189 the Grutter majority opted for an artificial and unrealistic attempt at simplicity, at the expense of a likely practically wiser approach. Most serious reflections on affirmative action are more multi-dimensional, more pluralistic, more holistic, and thus more genuinely encompassing and responsive to more concerns of more persons.
The Court in Grutter did go some distance in this direction, 190 but ultimately underplayed public interests in "remediation, compensation, corrective and distributive justice, broad utilitarianism, anti-subordination, integrationism and community preference, and the value of free and expert academic judgment." 191 Any given person might weigh each of these various considerations differently. For some persons, perhaps no single one of these interests would rise to the level of being truly compelling. But that is precisely the point. Often, under realistic complex circumstances, no single interest or reason by itself may seem genuinely compelling. But a number of distinct interests, pointing in the same general direction, may jointly seem compelling when properly combined in a "cumulative case." 192 Simply put, there are decisions that are best justified not on the basis of any single consideration, in isolation, but on the basis of an accumulation of more or less separate, distinguishable considerations. It is, for example, only on the basis of a complex cumulative case that some persons might best be able to justify attending college, attending some particular college, marrying a particular person, or accepting a particular job offer. More generally, judges who, like the proverbial fox, "know many little things," and who adopt a flexible, eclectic, multi-factor approach to a problem often do better than judges, who, like the proverbial hedgehog, "know one big thing" and seek to apply their inflexible template whenever possible. 193 The proverbial wisdom of the fox, more often borne out in practice, 194 may thus normally call for a more pluralistic approach than the Supreme Court adopted in Grutter and Gratz. 195 A more intellectually inclusive approach thus might well have been practically wiser. 
